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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

standards of "substantial justice."'1 2 9 But the conduct of the arbitration
hearing would be the same in a small claims action as it was for the
Rochester case. The only difference is that, whereas the arbitration
panel normally consists of three attorneys, claims for $500 or less are
before a single arbitrator.1 3 0 The Rochester rationale would not give
conclusive effect to such a proceeding. Even though the protection of a
party's rights might be as great in a small claims arbitration, the effect of
the award is equated to the judgment it replaces. As UCCA section
1808 limits the res judicata effect of small claims judgments, it should
similarly limit the effect of substitute small claims arbitration.
AxTCLE

42-

TRL&L BY THE COURT

CPLR 4213(b): Decision of trial court must state the essential facts.
CPLR 4213(b) provides that the decision of the court in a nonjury trial "may be oral or in writing and shall state the facts it deems
essential."1 31 Trial court decisions inadequately supported by findings
of fact are accorded one of three alternatives on appellate review:
reversal and remand for trial de novo; remand for further or amended
findings; and retention by the appellate court for its own findings of
fact.132 The disposition by the appellate court depends upon the degree
of inadequacy of the findings of fact. and the insufficiency of the
13
record.
In Nutone Inc. v. Bouley Co.,13 the trial court, in sustaining a
mechanic's lien for the plaintiff, neither made findings of fact nor
established any record whatsoever. The appellate court reversed the
decision and noted that issues were created which required factual
determination as to whether the plaintiff had performed his contractual
obligations with the defendant entitling the former to recover. The
129 Supreme Burglar Alarm Corp. v. Mason, 204 Misc. 185, 186, 122 N.YS.2d 398, 399

(App. T. 1st Dep't 1953).
13022 N.Y.C.R.R. § 28.2(a) (1970).
131 CPLR 4213(b); see 4 WK&-M
4213.07.
1324 WK&M
4213.09.
133 A new trial generally follows when the findings are unsupported by the facts and
the record gives insufficient basis of essential facts found by the court. E.g., Harris v. Doley,
22 App. Div. 2d 769, 253 N.YS.2d 645 (1st Dep't 1964); Driskell v. Alfano, 12 App. Div. 2d
973, 211 N.YS.2d 668 (2d Dep't 1961); Kundla v. Symans, 9 App. Div. 2d 1021, 194 N.Y.S.2d
251 (4th Dep't 1959). A remand to enable the trial court to formulate adequate findings
follows where the proper decision was reached but the findings are inadequate. E.g.,
Conklin v. State, 22 App. Div. 2d 481, 256 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3d Dep't 1965); Ahleim v. State,
21 App. Div. 2d 747, 250 N.YS.2d 242 (4th Dep't 1964). Occasionally, an appellate court will
prepare findings of fact when the trial court record is sufficiently complete although the
findings of fact are inadequate. E.g., Mellon v. Street, 23 App. Div. 2d 210, 259 N.YS.2d

900 (3d Dep't 1965).
134-

App. Div. 2d -,

327 N.Y.S.2d 256 (4th Dep't 1971).
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court implied that it would exercise its fact-finding authority in a
proper case. 185
The requirement of CPLR 4213(b) is sound and well settled. To
insure intelligent appellate review there must be a sufficient factual
basis upon which to pass. Exceptions have been made by appellate
courts where there is a sufficient record although inadequate findings
of fact, and the decision is compelling. 136 However, the present case
comes well within the proscription of CPLR 4213(b), since the total
absence of an oral or written decision and findings of fact left the appellate court with a tabula rasa to review.
ARTICLE 50 -

JUDGMENTS GENERALLY

CPLR 5003: Interest on a judgment is not a basis for a separateaction.
In Ferguson v. City of New York, 1 37 the Supreme Court, Orange

County, was called upon to determine "whether a separate action can
be maintained to fix the amount of interest due on a judgment while
an appeal is pending, such appeal having been instituted by the plaintiffs in the collateral action."'13 The court reasoned that
[i]nterest on a judgment has no independent existence from the
judgment upon which it is predicated and cannot be the basis for
a new and separate action which seeks to modify either the amount,
or the rate of interest previously awarded. 13 9
Plaintiffs, dissatisfied with the interest awarded to them, were advised
to appeal or to apply for modification of their judgments. 140
ARTICLE

52

-ENFORCEMENT

OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5231(d): Service upon judgment debtor as agent of corporation
held ineffective.

Income execution against money which a judgment debtor is receiving or will receive is available under CPLR 5231(d). The procedural safeguards for this remedy include service upon the judgment
debtor if possible and service upon the third party against whose debt
135 See Power v. Falk, 15 App. Div. 2d 216, 222 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Ist Dep't 1961), where
reasons were assigned for not exercising the court's fact-finding authority. The present
case approved the Falk rationale.
136 E.g., Mellon v. Street, 23 App. Div. 2d 210, 259 N.Y.S.2d 900 (3d Dep't 1965);
Weidman v. Klot, 11 App. Div. 2d 641, 201 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Ist Dept 1960) (holding that the
trial testimony and documents received in evidence were a sufficient basis upon which to
make findings of fact).
'3767 Misc. 2d 812, 324 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1971).
138 Id. at 814, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
139 Id. at 815, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
140 Id.

